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Sex as an “accident”
Simon Connell, the University of Otago
considers ACC cover for unintended pregnancies
I
n Allenby v H [2010] NZSC 33, the Supreme Court ruled
that pregnancy qualified as a “personal injury” under the
accident compensation legislation and that H could claim
ACC cover for a pregnancy resulting from a failed sterilisa-
tion. The Supreme Court also stated that a pregnancy result-
ing from rape could receive cover as personal injury caused
by an accident. A majority went on to say that consensual sex
would not qualify as an “accident” for ACC purposes. This
note considers that issue further.
COVER FOR PREGNANCY
The history of cover for pregnancy under the ACC scheme is
a muddled series of legislative changes and judicial decisions,
rightly described by Blanchard J at [68] as “torturous”. One
constant throughout the scheme is that a condition must
qualify as a “personal injury” and be caused under certain
circumstances to receive cover. H would have had cover for
her pregnancy resulting from failed sterilisation had it hap-
pened prior to the commencement of the Accident Rehabili-
tation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. The 1992 Act
substantially restructured the scheme and introduced new
definitions of “personal injury” and “accident”. This was in
part a response to “a series of statutory, administrative and
judicial decisions [that] resulted in an extension of the scheme’s
boundaries beyond what was originally intended” (W F
Birch Accident Compensation: A Fairer Scheme (Office of
the Minister of Labour, Wellington, 1991) at 8.) The 1992
Act was silent as to cover for pregnancy, so the question
arises: did the 1992 Act intend to continue cover for preg-
nancy, or exclude it? The relevant 1992 Act definitions were
carried through to the current act, the Accident Compensa-
tion Act 2001 (“the 2001 Act”), so the answer to that
question applies to the current ACC scheme and to H, who
became pregnant in 2005 after the failed sterilisation proce-
dure in 2004.
After the introduction of the 1992 Act there were several
District Court decisions declining cover for unwanted preg-
nancies resulting from failed sterilisations on the basis that
pregnancy was not a “personal injury” under the then new
legislative scheme. The question was first addressed by the
High Court in Accident Compensation Corporation v D
[2007] NZAR 679 (HC), where Mallon J, after a detailed
discussion of the physical effects of pregnancy on a woman
(at [71]–[76]) found that pregnancy resulting from a failed
sterilisation was covered. The decision was overturned in
ACC v D ( [2008] NZCA 576), by a majority of the Court of
Appeal who thought that the 1992 Act was intended to
remove cover for pregnancy.
ALLENBY
H became pregnant after a failed sterilisation that had been
performed by the appellant medical practitioner, against
whom she brought civil proceedings. Allenby applied to
strike out the proceedings on the basis that they were caught
by the bar on civil proceedings for personal injury (2001 Act,
s 317.) Since the issue of pregnancy resulting from failed
sterilisation had been addressed by the Court of Appeal in
ACC v D, the High Court removed the application to the
Court of Appeal, which granted a formal judgment adhering
to ACC v D in order to allow the matter to reach the Supreme
Court (Allenby v H [2011] NZCA 251.) In the Supreme
Court, Allenby sought to use the ACC scheme as a shield
against a civil remedy. The Accident Compensation Corpo-
ration argued against cover. H was neutral to the outcome of
the case because either way she would have a remedy.
The Supreme Court bench all adopted Mallon J’s approach
to the interpretation of “personal injury” ([18] per Elias CJ,
[51] per Blanchard J and [88] per Tipping J) and all found
that pregnancy fell within the definition of “personal injury.”
After surveying the“torturous”historynotedabove,BlanchardJ
(who gave the reasons of himself, McGrath and William
Young JJ) stated at [68] that:
[T]wo conclusions can immediately be drawn. The first is
that, as has been seen in the description of the provisions
of the 2001 Act, the expression “personal injury” is used
in an expansive way. It has a statutory meaning. The
second is that it is most unlikely that Parliament, having
expressly extended the scheme in 1974 to give cover for
pregnancy resulting from rape, would have sought to
remove that cover in 1992 without very directly address-
ing the subject in the new legislative provisions.
Tipping J agreed with Blanchard J but gave a separate
judgment to state his own reasons “[b]ecause of the signifi-
cance of the issues involved” ([85]). Elias CJ gave a separate
judgment to add some technical points to the discussion of
pregnancy as a personal injury, and express reservations over
what the other Judges had to say about the relevant of
consent to cover for personal injury by accident.
SEX AS AN ACCIDENT
Since pregnancy is a personal injury, and the ACC scheme
provides cover for personal injury by accident, pregnancy
resulting from sex is covered under the scheme if sex falls
within the definition of “accident”. The definition of acci-
dent includes the application of a force external to the human
body (s 25(1)(a)(i)), and the Supreme Court had no difficulty
concluding that rape was an accident (per Elias CJ at [15],
Blanchard J at [72] and Tipping J at [92].) Mallon J in ACC
v D may have thought otherwise. When briefly addressing
whether consensual sex was an accident she stated at [88]
that “[i]t might be argued that it is outside the definition
because if the force remains external no pregnancy will
result”.
The definition of accident says nothing about intent or
consent. On the face of it, this suggests that pregnancy
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resulting from rape and pregnancy resulting from consensual
sex are both personal injury caused by accident for ACC
purposes. The Supreme Court realised this, and, apart from
Elias CJ, were keen to close the floodgates.
Blanchard and Tipping JJ both thought that Parliament
clearly could not have intended unwanted pregnancy from
consensual sex to be covered by ACC. Blanchard J at [82]
stated “where a woman chooses to engage in intercourse,
during which she suffers no physical harm but as a result of
which she falls pregnant, it cannot sensibly be said that there
has been an “accident” within the statutory definition” and
that consensual sex as an accident was “plainly” outside the
purposes of the accident compensation scheme.
Tipping J at [93] stated that “Parliament cannot have
intended that the force involved in a consensual case would
mean that an ensuing unwanted pregnancy which occurred
by reason, for example, of failed contraception or careless-
ness as to contraception, had cover under the Act because it
resulted from an accident” and at [94] said that consensual
sex as an accident was “contrary to the policy and purposes
of the accident compensation legislation”.
To which we might respond: Exactly what policy and
which purposes are those that justify a special definition of
“accident” that takes into account for sex and only for sex?
The interpretation section of the 2001 Act (s 6) states that
“accident” has its defined meaning unless the context other-
wise requires, but it is still an extraordinary feat of statutory
interpretation to introduce a special definition for sex.
RISK-TAKING AND CONSENT TO INJURY
The ACC scheme is generally no-fault. Risk-taking or care-
lessness is no basis for disqualification. This is reflected in the
definition of accident, which does not mention consent, and
the definition of work-related personal injury which states
that it is irrelevant to the decision whether a person suffered
a work-related personal injury that, when the event occurred,
the injured person was acting in contravention of instruc-
tions or indulging in misconduct, skylarking or negligence
(s 28(7)).
There are some cases where consent is relevant for ACC
purposes. The scheme provides cover for what are called
“sensitive claims” — mental injuries resulting from acts that
fall within the description of various sexual offences. The
Court of Appeal in KSB v ACC [2012] NZCA confirmed that
sensitive claim cover for sexual violation requires a lack of
consent on the part of the victim. The Court of Appeal
thought it was inconceivable that Parliament intended to
provide cover for mental injury resulting from consensual
sex. That said, the kind of “consent” the Court of Appeal
had in mind in KSB was informed consent. Failure to disclose
HIV status, for example, would vitiate that consent.
The 2001 Act provides machinery to address wilfully
self-inflicted injuries and suicide. Rather than exclude such
unhappy events from the definition of “accident”, entitle-
ments are limited. Section 119 of the Act states that ACC
must not pay any entitlements in such cases, other than
treatment and services ancillary to treatment. An exception
applies if the claimant has a mental injury covered by ACC.
Courts have set a high threshold for when a claimant is
regarded as having wilfully self-inflicted an injury. For example,
in Big Glory Seafoods v ARCIC (DC Auckland 90/98, 5 May
1998), Judge Beattie found that a claimant who punched a
freezer in a display of machismo intended the punch but did
not wilfully intend the resulting wrist fracture.
Applying this reasoning, if consensual sex was an acci-
dent, then a resulting unwanted pregnancy is not a wilfully
self-inflicted injury and disentitlement under s 119 would not
apply. In the case of intended pregnancy, s 119 would apply,
but ACC would still be liable for treatment. Imposing the
cost of treatment for intended pregnancies on the ACC
scheme cannot have been intended, which does provide one
reason to adopt a special definition of accident for sex.
The definition of “treatment injury” (which replaced “medi-
cal misadventure” and is an alternative ground for cover to
“accident”) at s 32(2)(c) excludes “personal injury that is a
result of a person unreasonably withholding or delaying their
consent to undergo treatment”. Injuries suffered as a result of
treatment while the claimant is a participant in a clinical trial
can qualify as a treatment injury if the claimant did not give
their written agreement (s 32(4)–(5).)
The consistent theme here is that only in clear cases of
intent (consent to sex, wilfully self-inflicted injury, agreeing
to a clinical trial) does the legislation bar cover or limit
entitlements. It is not clear what the justification is for
applying a weaker approach to sex.
DRAWING LINES
As Elias CJ observed at [7], the accident compensation
legislation provides cover on the basis of line-drawing which
reflects policy choices. These policy choices should be made
by Parliament; they involve spending public money and
choosing between competing policy objectives. We should be
cautious of judicial pronouncements of what Parliament can
or cannot have intended where no further reasoning is given.
What Parliament can be conceived as having intended changes
over time, as attitudes change. In L v M ([1979] 2 NZLR 519
(CA)), Cooke J thought that conception and childbirth,
however unwanted, could not naturally be described as
personal injuries. In XY v ACC ((1984) 2 NZFLR 376 (HC)),
Jeffries J stated at 380 that:
The Court does not find that our supreme legislative body
intended to stigmatise possibly the highest expression of
love between human beings, that of a mother for her child,
as a continuing injury by making compensation payable
during dependency.
The Supreme Court in Allenby viewed pregnancy in quite a
different light. Is it really so clear that consensual sex could
not be regarded as an “accident”? In ordinary speech an
“accidental pregnancy” has meaning. There is no clear prin-
ciple behind the lines drawn by Allenby.
It is not clear why an unwanted pregnancy resulting from a
failedsterilisationshouldbetreateddifferentlyfromoneresult-
ingfromaburstcondom(whichBlanchardJusesasanexample
at [82].) In both cases, precautions have been taken but failed.
There might even be an argument that the failure of a pre-
scribed condom is a treatment injury — treatment includes the
provision of prophylaxis and the failure of any equipment,
device, or tool used as part of the treatment process
(s33(1)(f)–(g)). It isalsonotclearwhycarelessnessastocontra-
ception should be treated differently from carelessness to risk
of anyotherkindof injury.
Importing consent into the definition of “accident”cuts
against the no-fault nature of the scheme and carves out an
exception for sex with no clear justification. Perhaps in the
future, themajority’s viewofwhatParliament intendedwillbe
rejected, as they rejected earlier pronouncements that preg-
nancycouldnothavebeen intended tobeapersonal injury. r
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